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LIZZIE'S LAW: HEALING THE SCARS OF DOMESTIC
MURDER-AN EMERGING NATIONAL MODEL
"This boy is Ignorance.... most of all beware this boy, for on
his brow I see that written which is Doom, unless the writing be
erased.'
INTRODUCTION
On August 15, 1997 the Massachusetts State Legislature
enacted House Bill No. 4689,2 subsequently referred to as
"Lizzie's Law."3 In doing so, the Legislature not only de-
nounced state ignorance toward the rights of child victims4 of
domestic murder5 but also made national history in the pro-
cess.
6
In Springfield, Massachusetts during August of 1995,
Charles R. Thompson, Jr., entered the bedroom of his es-
tranged wife Andrea "Holly" Thompson, slit his wife's throat
and stabbed her twenty-four times while his three year old
daughter Elizabeth Thompson watched.7 Charles Thompson
then positioned his daughter Elizabeth within her deceased
mother's arms, where she remained until morning and discov-
ery dawned four hours later.' Thompson was arrested, tried,
and convicted of the first degree murder of his wife and sen-
I CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 98 (St. Martin's Press 1993).
2 H.B. 4689, Ch. 77, 1997 First Annual Session (Mass. 1997).
' See Don Aucoin, Murder Victim's Family Asks Lawmakers to OK "Lizzie's
Law," BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 1997, at B2.
' The term "child victim" represents a surviving child who may or may not be
a witness to an act of domestic murder.
' Act of murder defined by the Massachusetts State Legislature wherein one
parent is convicted of the murder of his or her child's other parent. H.B. 4689, re-
printed in 1 Mass. St. Legis., 1st Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LIZZIE'S LAW,
1997, at 3101 (1997).
6 See Lizzie's Lasting Legacy, BOSTON HERALD, August 18, 1997, at 24.
See Margery Eagan, After 'Bad Man" Killed Mommy, Lizzie Deserves Law to
Guard Her, BOSTON HERALD, June 8, 1997, at 37.
. See Massachusetts Expected to Enact "Lizzie's Law," BUFFALO NEWS, July 4,
1997, at A7.
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tenced to life imprisonment without parole For Charles
Thompson, the above ordeal came to a confined ending. For his
daughter Elizabeth Thompson and similar child victims of
domestic murder, the ordeal just began.
Upon incarceration, Thompson exercised his parental
rights,' ° demanding that Elizabeth visit him in prison twice a
month and accept telephone calls from him once a week."
This request was made against the wishes of Elizabeth
Thompson, who allegedly referred to her father as the "bad
man" and covered her eyes when she saw his face on televi-
sion." The Massachusetts State Legislature recognized Eliza-
beth Thompson's plight and thereupon decreed that under
specific circumstances, a child's rights, namely, a child's wish
not to visit his or her incarcerated parent convicted of domestic
murder, may outweigh seemingly fundanental parental rights
of visitation. On August 15, 1997 the Legislature enacted
"Lizzie's Law," 3 which provides child victims of domestic
murder with a legal remedy when confronted with a convicted
parent's unwelcome visitation request.'4 Specifically, Massa-
chusetts General Laws, namely, chapters 119 (Section 35), 208
(Section 28), 209 (Section 37), and 209C (Section 3(a)) were
amended to include Lizzie's Law, which suspends the visitation
rights of incarcerated parents convicted of first degree domestic
murder. Lizzie's Law suspends such rights by prohibiting
any court in the State of Massachusetts from making an order
which would provide visitation rights to a parent convicted of
murder in the first degree of the other parent of the child who
is the subject of the order." By providing stringent, legal pro-
See Lizzie's Lasting Legacy, supra note 6, at 24.
10 The Supreme Court has recognized the right to raise one's children as a
basic, fundamental civil right of man. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
See discussion infra Part II.C.
n See Lizzie Deserves Better, BOSTON HERALD, July 22, 1997, at 44.
1 See Aucoin, supra note 3.
13 The Massachusetts Act was termed "Lizzie's Law" in recognition of the
plight of Elizabeth Thompson.
14 See Massachusetts Expected to Enact "Lizzie's Law," supra note 8.
15 See infra note 16.
" Section 35 of chapter 119, section 28 of chapter 208, section 37 of chapter
209, and subsection (a) of section 3 of chapter 209C of the General Laws provides:
No court shall make an order providing visitation rights to a parent who
has been convicted of murder in the first degree of the other parent of
the child who is the subject of the order, unless such child is of suitable
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tection to child victims of domestic murder, Lizzie's Law repre-
sents the first law of its kind in the nation.'7 As such, it has
been hailed as not only a ground-breaking endeavor in the
field of children's rights but also as an emerging national
model.
Beneath the emotional hoopla, however, lie several con-
flicting issues that may threaten the seemingly secure foun-
dation and/or future of Lizzie's Law. Specifically, a threshold
question exists as to whether Lizzie's Law extends beyond
reason the state doctrine of parens patriae.'5 Also, can a state
government unequivocally impair the seemingly fundamental
right of childrearing of those parents convicted of first degree
domestic murder without violating their constitutional rights of
due process, substantive due process and/or equal protection
under the law? This Note seeks to answer not only the above
questions but also whether Lizzie's Law may be further ex-
tended to limit the visitation rights not only of parents con-
victed of first degree domestic murder but also those convicted
of lesser degrees of domestic murder and/or similar exceedingly
violent acts against their child's other parent. Part I of this
Note discusses the parental rights of parents who are incarcer-
ated following their commission of the act of murder against
their child's other parent. By surveying state case law, this
Part examines under what circumstances the parental rights of
incarcerated parents have been given priority by the courts
over those of the child victim at issue. This Part further dis-
age to signify his assent and assents to such order; provided, further,
that until such order is issued, no person shall visit, with the child pres-
ent, a parent who has been convicted of murder in the first degree of the
other parent of the child without the consent of the child's custodian or
legal guardian.
H.B. 4689, Ch. 77, 1997 First Annual Session (Mass. 1997).
17 See Dick Case, 'Don't Make Us Visit Our Father"-Grandparents Fight to
Keep Children From Their Murderous Dad, SYRACUSE HERALD AM., August 10,
1997, at B1.
" Parens patriae, literally "parent of the country," refers to the role of the
state as the guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the
insane. See State of W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.
1971). Further, parens patriae refers to the role of the state as sovereign in child
custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests
of a child. More succinctly, it is "the principle that the state must care for those
who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and
custody from their parents." BLAcK'S LAW DICIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990); see also
DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, § 1.02, at 10 (1994).
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cusses the specific role the judiciary has played in assessing
the weight to be given parental rights, namely, which way
have the courts swung in the past-toward recognizing child
victims of domestic violence or toward upholding the parental
rights of convicted parents? Part II of this Note examines
Massachusetts' Lizzie's Law, including a more detailed discus-
sion of the impetus behind Massachusetts' enactment of
Lizzie's Law and the State's rationale for recognizing a child's
voice in the specific instance of first degree domestic murder.
Part II further considers the constitutional implications of
Lizzie's Law, namely, whether Massachusetts may impinge
upon the arguably fundamental childrearing right of parents
convicted of first degree domestic murder without violating
their constitutional rights in the process. Part III of this Note
addresses Lizzie's Law's nationwide following and specifically
examines one state's attempt, namely, New York, to rewrite
and enact its version of a child protection act similar to Lizzie's
Law (hereinafter termed "The Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act")
along with the support and opposition it has encountered. Part
IV addresses the problems inherent in Massachusetts' Lizzie's
Law and proposes improvements to the legislation including,
but not limited to, clarification of ambiguous language, broad-
ening of the conviction base, and the inclusion of not only nat-
ural birth parents but of all persons occupying a distinctly
parental role in a child's life who are subsequently convicted of
violent offenses (e.g., first degree domestic murder, second
degree domestic murder, and first degree sexual crimes)
against the child's other parent. Finally, Part V of this Note
evaluates public policy supporting the enactment of individual
state's child protection acts similar to Lizzie's Law and the
consequences, if any, of the failure of society to recognize the
voice of child victims of domestic murder.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview: National Treatment of Domestic Murder Cases
Examining state case law, an inconsistent pattern of judi-
cial decision-making is readily apparent in cases determining
parental rights when one parent is convicted of killing his or
her child's other parent and subsequently requests visitation
[Vol. 64: 4BROOL.YN LAW RE--VIEW1244
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with the child victim. When a parent is murdered, a conflict of
interest regularly arises as to who should retain access to, or
custody of, the child victim at issue. This conflict operates
between the surviving convicted parent and third party inter-
ests, such as the state, foster parents, other relatives, and the
children, themselves. 9 When faced with such dilemma, state
courts have commonly accorded preference to the incarcerated
birth parent above and beyond third party interests.0 This
preference stems from the high degree of appreciation courts
have attributed to the parent-child relationship above all oth-
ers.21 While it may be said that recognition of the rights of
children has grown steadfastly over the last few decades,22 in
no way has such recognition surpassed courts' regard for the
overwhelming rights of parents in general. In fact, many courts
continue to assert that the rights extended to children should
never be the same as those extended to adults. The reasoning
behind this assertion rests on the belief that children often
lack the necessary capabilities to make critical decisions.'
Courts have had to grapple with many factors when determin-
ing parental rights disputes. As a result of the large array of
considerations (not the least of which may be general public
concern), it is not surprising then that an inconsistent line of
state case law has developed in the area of visitation, custody
and/or termination of parental rights following an incident of
domestic murder.
Examining courts' approaches to termination of parental
rights disputes following instances of domestic murder, several
courts have demonstrated a reluctance to focus solely on the
parent's act of murder as the definitive act requiring termina-
19 See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domes-
tic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1077 (1991).
2 See In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574 (R.I. 1987) (lacking an unquestionable
finding of unfitness, natural parents' right to bear and raise their child in a less
than perfect way remains superior to the rights of foster parents who may be
deemed exemplary nurturers).
21 The right of a parent to maintain a relationship with his or her child has
been described as transcending all other rights and being rooted in nature. See In
re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982); see also discussion infra Part II.C.
See KRAmER, supra note 18, § 1.04, at 15-16.
See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (when applied to children,
constitutional principles should be applied flexibly as children are often unable to
make critical decisions).
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tion of parental rights. Notwithstanding the degree of violence
associated with such act, several courts have looked to other
factors such as parental fitness, instances of abandonment,
instances of neglect, etc., prior to disallowing a convicted par-
ent contact with his or her children.' In Bartasavich v.
Mitchell,' for example, the court found that the natural
father's conviction of voluntary manslaughter in the death of
his child's mother, by itself, did not meet statutory require-
ments for termination of parental rights. Instead, the court
focused upon the Pennsylvania statutory criterium of parental
fitness, stressing the importance of the father's parental care,
as natural birth parent, to the child at issue. Moreover, the
Bartasavich court found the father's incapacity as a parent due
to his conviction and incarceration not to warrant termination
of parental rights since his incapacity resulted from a one-time
conviction and limited term of incarceration, which was not of
a "repeated and continuous" nature-that state's statutory stan-
dard to terminate parental rights.26 Thus, in determining
whether to terminate parental rights, the Bartasavich court
overlooked the domestic murder situation at issue, favoring
instead an examination of state statutory factors. In addition
21 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney 1997).
- 471 A.2d 833 (Pa. 1984).
21 Id. Specifically, the court stated that in order to terminate parental rights, a
parent's incapacity must be repeated and continuous and that "appellants action
was not repeated, although it could be argued that it is continuous in effect." Id.
at 836; see also In re Adoption of M.J.H., 501 A.2d 648 (Pa. 1985) (One year fol-
lowing Bartasavich, the same court applied the same termination standard to a
father convicted of killing the mother of his child. The father's parental rights
were terminated as, unlike the father's limited incarceration in Bartasavich, defen-
dant in In re M.J.H. was serving a life sentence.); In re Abdullah, 423 N.E.2d 915
(Ill. 1981) (court found single criminal conviction insufficient to terminate parental
rights weighing instead several state statutory factors including the nature of the
crime, the identify of the victim, and the severity of the sentence imposed); In re
H.L.T., 298 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. 1982) (court did not focus solely upon murder of child's
mother when determining whether parental rights should have been terminated.
Instead, the court was primarily concerned with the lower court's failure to satisfy
a clear and convincing standard of proof mandated by state statute. Moreover, the
court emphasized the statutory factor of parental fitness, i.e., the father's model
inmate status, the fact that he would have a job and home following incarceration,
and the father's interest in maintaining contact with his child, thereby disallowing
termination of parental rights. Specifically, the court stated that when one parent
kills another parent, such act does not, in and of itself, cause the forfeiture of the
killer's parental rights as a matter of law.) Id. at 34 (citing Sturkie v. Skinner,
104 S.E.2d 417 (Ga. 1958)).
1246 [Vol. 64:4
HEALING THE SCARS OF DOMESTIC MURDER
to weighing state statutory factors more heavily than the act of
domestic murder, courts have utilized prior state case law to
give preclusive effect to a consideration of domestic murder in
a termination of parental rights dispute. For instance, in In re
Adoption by Benigno-White, prior case law' precluded the
court from solely considering the father's murder conviction in
the death of his child's mother in order to terminate his paren-
tal rights. Following precedent, the court stated that it would
concentrate "on the consequences of the act, not on the nature
of the act itself."29 Thus, the Benigno-White court terminated
the father's parental rights not on the basis of his murder
conviction but on the basis of the consequences of his actions.
Specifically, the father's long-term (thirty year) incarceration
indicated an abandonment of his child under state statutory
law and an inability of the father to perform the regular and
expected parental fumctions of care and support 3 for the
child.3'
In addition to the above, several courts have failed to suffi-
ciently consider domestic murder when fashioning visitation,
custody and/or termination of parental rights orders even when
they are mandated to consider the same by statute.32 Other
27 537 A.2d 1345 (N.J. 1987).
2 The court in Benigno-White looked to the earlier court decision of In re
Adoption of J., 354 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1976) (case involved father's murder of his
children's mother). The dissent of Judge Crahay, which was subsequently adopted
by the New Jersey Supreme Court and the court in Benigno-White, stated,
"[hiowever heinous the act of slaying may have been and however destructive of
the family unit, it does not follow .... that it constitutes a failure to perform
parental obligations ... so as to allow the irrevocable cessation of all parental
rights." Id. at 669. The original opinion in In re Adoption of J. held a contrasting
view. Specifically, the majority opinion held, "Ii]f the crime committed by a parent
results in a conviction and is itself palpably hurtful to the child, then the com-
mission of the crime should be a potent, if not determinative, factor in the evalua-
tion of whether by that conduct the parent has forsaken his parental obligations."
Id. at 666.
29 Benigno-White, 537 A.2d at 1348.
20 See id. at 1349.
21 See Heath v. McGuire, 306 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. 1983) (court chose to terminate
father's parental rights by strictly evaluating the consequences of the murderous
act, i.e., the child was deprived by his mother's death; the father was unfit to care
for the child because of his life sentence conviction; such deprivation caused the
child to suffer physically, mentally and emotionally; and a future relationship be-
tween the father and son would be harmful to the child.); see also Brown v. De-
partment of Human Resources, 276 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. 1981).
32 See Mara Youdelman, The Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act: Its
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courts have discounted the act of domestic murder and re-
duced, by maneuvering around the absence of specific legis-
lation addressing the issue, the degree of consideration given
to such act. For instance, in In re Lutgen33 an Illinois appel-
late court affirmed the lower trial court's grant of child custody
to a man convicted in the manslaughter strangulation death of
his wife stating that "a single criminal conviction, without
more, will not support a finding of unfitness based upon de-
pravity."' The court buttressed its conclusion by stating that
since neither Illinois courts nor the state legislature had seen
fit to enact a rule of law mandating that the killing of one
parent by the other in the presence of their children would be
sufficient, acting alone, to deprive that parent of his/her paren-
tal rights, the Lutgen court also would not solely consider said
act. 5
The above judicial reduction in the degree of consideration
given to domestic murder situations, is not uncommon. State
courts have often discounted the act of domestic murder by
assessing the relative "seriousness" of the crime committed.
For instance, in In re James M.,3" the court held the father's
second degree murder conviction in the stabbing death of his
children's mother to not be the type of felony that would prove
a person to be unfit to have the custody of his or her minor
children 7 "as would, perhaps, have been the case had the kill-
Impact on Custody and Visitation Cases Involving Domestic Violence, 13 PROB. L.J.
189 (1996).
532 N.E.2d 976 (Ill. 1988).
" Id. at 985. In lessening the degree of consideration given to the act of do-
mestic murder, the Lutgen court gave great weight to the father's order to his
children that they stay out of the living room so that they could not watch the
murder take place. Id. at 985-86.
' See id. at 986. With regard to the domestic violence factor statutorily re-
quired to be considered, the court decided that the legislature had not accorded
this factor any more weight than any other factor. Id. at 987; see also Cahn, su-
pra note 19, at 1080.
36 135 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976).
' See id. at 265-66. The court further qualified the father's second degree
murder conviction by stating that "the crime was a crime of passion, not the prod-
uct of a vicious and violent character, but comprehensible within the framework of
human folly, weakness and imperfection." Id. at 266. Moreover, the court went on
to state that beyond the murderous act, in order to deny custody it would be
imperative that there be a showing of "failure on the part of the neglecting parent
in his or her direct relationship with the child." Id.
1248 [Vol. 64: 4
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ing been accomplished in the presence of the child victim."'
The James court further stated that the lower court might
reasonably have found that the father's second degree murder
of his children's mother did not constitute direct neglect of the
children39 as the killing of the mother was not cruelty prac-
ticed upon the children despite the subsequent deprivation of
care and love of a mother figure in their lives.4 ° By stringent-
ly examining and qualifying the specific circumstances sur-
rounding a domestic murder situation and subsequently dimin-
ishing the degree of seriousness attributed to the murder itself,
courts have often either misplaced or reduced the relevance of
such act when determining termination of parental rights
disputes.
A similar practice appears to have developed in the area of
parental visitation and/or custody disputes. Addressing convict-
ed parents' requests for visitation, courts have been hard-
pressed to completely deny visitation to such parents without
specific legislative edicts and/or extraordinary circumstances
which would make visitation clearly inappropriate.4' In fact,
visitation has often been limited or denied only in those in-
stances where a parent convicted of domestic murder has been
shown to suffer from severe mental or moral deficiencies that
would constitute a "grave threat" to a child.42 While it would
seem that the label of "grave threat" would adequately attach
to the act or even attempted act of domestic murder alone, in
reality this has not been the case. For instance, in Kim v. Kim,
a California court awarded a father unmonitored visitation
with his daughter despite his attempted murder of the child's
mother, a near fatal shooting rendering her paralyzed.4"
39 Id.
31 See id. at 265. The James court further stated, [uindoubtedly there may be
felonies that, without more, prove a person to be unfit to have the custody of his
or her minor children. Such may be crimes that show the depravity of the parent
or involve abuse of the child . . . [s]econd degree murder is not necessarily among
these." Id. at 265-66.
40 Id.
'1 See Cahn, supra note 19, at 1092.
42 See Commonwealth ex rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 91 A.2d 379 (Pa. 1952).
3 208 Cal. App. 3d 364, 256 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1989) (court therein subsequently
restricted the father's visitation privileges only following substantial psychiatric
evaluation over a period of some time).
1998] 1249
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
In fact, even following an incident of clearly disturbing
effect and seemingly grave consequences, state courts are re-
luctant to place a child's visitation interests above his or her
parent's. In Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Betty Lotz,4 the
Pennsylvania court overlooked a child's wish not to see her
father following an alleged incident of physical abuse. While
not a subtopic found within the category of domestic murder,
physical abuse should arguably be considered of grave threat
to a child. The Lotz court, however, overlooked both said threat
and the child's wishes against visitation, instead compelling
the child's mother to force the child to visit her father finding
that the physical abuse between father and child was not of
"such a serious nature that it should work a permanent es-
trangement."45 When the issue is visitation (a less intense
and extended form of parent-child contact), children's wishes in
the past have largely gone ignored.
Considering the above, there fails to exist a clear cut line
of judicial decision-making which unequivocally recognizes
domestic murder as prima facie evidence rendering suspension
or termination of visitation/custody privileges and/or termina-
tion of parental rights appropriate. Case law does exist, howev-
er, which recognizes the ramifications the act of parental mur-
der may have upon the parent-child relationship.
For example, while the New Mexico court in Matter of
Adoption of Doe41 ultimately terminated parental rights on
the basis of neglect, the court recognized and addressed the
detrimental implications of the father's second degree murder
of his child's mother stating that such murder struck at the
heart of the family.47 The court further added that the
father's conviction proved his inability to appreciate the impact
of his actions and to respect the emotional and physical needs
4 146 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1958).
"' Id. at 363; see also Illinois Dept. of Public Aid ex rel. Dix v. Gagnon, 680
N.E.2d 509 (Ill. 1997) (court found mother incorrect in stating that child's prefer-
ence not to see her father is a primary factor relative to decrees of visitation);
Fernald v. Fernald, 302 A.2d 470 (Pa. 1973) (court found father's abandonment of
family and drinking fits in front of his children to not constitute a grave threat
and thereby required children, against their wishes, to visit their father);
Commonwealth ex rel. Turner v. Strange, 115 A.2d 885 (Pa. 1955) (fact that child
does not wish visitation by a parent is not controlling).
4'6 657 P.2d 134 (N.M. 1982).
47 See id. at 138.
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of his child.48  Similarly, while the court in Nancy v.
Randolph49 ultimately terminated parental rights largely
based upon the father's history of violence toward the deceased
mother and threats of violence toward the child, the court did
recognize the father's first degree murder of the child's mother
to be the ultimate act of savagery to that child.5 ° In addition,
the Randolph court, accounting for emotional and psychological
scarring the child had sustained as a result of the child's
mother's death at the hands of the child's father, stated it
could "conceive of few circumstances in which the termination
of parental rights would be more justified."5
Recognition of the detrimental effects of domestic murder
on the parent-child relationship has led to similar recognition
of the need to consider the wishes of child victims. Specifically,
the court in Daly v. Daly2 recognized a child's desire to be a
"specific consideration" relative to determinations involving
visitation disputes.53 Honoring the child victim's wishes, the
Daly court suspended a father's visitation rights when the
child victim expressed emotional and mental disturbance at
being in the presence of her father.54 Thus, while state case
See id. Specifically, the court stated, "[ilt is painfully plain that the father's
killing of the mother forever deprives the child of her maternal presence and be-
ing-the essence of childhood. A more horrendous wrong to a child is difficult to
conceive." Id. at 137 (citing Adoption of J., 354 A.2d 662, 667 (N.J. 1976), rev'd,
372 A.2d 607 (N.J. 1977)).
4' 356 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1987).
'O Id. at 470.
" Id.; see also In re Welfare of J.H.D., 416 N.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Minn. 1987)
(where father shot wife in presence of children, court considered spousal abuse as
substantial factor in parental rights termination proceeding); In Interest of A.R.M.,
750 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo. 1988) (court terminated parental rights on basis of aban-
donment yet specifically addressed father's murder of child's mother stating that
the "nature of the crime . . . resulted in the disintegration of the family unit and
left the child without even a modicum of parental nurturing during the incarcera-
tion of the remaining parent. It is difficult to conceive of a more calamitous event
for a child than the murder of her mother by her father. It is absurd for the
perpetrator of such a vile act to argue that he should retain his parental rights
concerning that child."); In re Opinion of Doe, 657 P.2d 134, 135 (N.M. 1982)
(court terminated parental rights on basis of neglect stating the "willful murder of
the child's mother by the father constitutes a total neglect of his parental obliga-
tions toward the child in that he permanently removed the child's mother who
could have provided for the child's needs.").
12 715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986).
53 Id. at 58.
54 See id.
1998]
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law, in fact, appears to be pervaded with judicial opinions
discounting the relevance of domestic murder, a minority of
states have recognized the detrimental ramifications of such
act and the subsequent relevance of recognizing the child
victim's voice.
Inconsistencies readily exist within state case law when
the element of domestic murder is a factor in a parental rights
dispute. In practice, the degree of protection afforded parental
rights varies greatly from state to state as a result of two
truths: State legislatures have wide discretion in determining
the criteria for suspension and/or termination of parental
rights, and the states' judiciary possess even greater discretion
in interpreting the criteria set forth by their legislatures, often,
perhaps, imposing their own prejudices under the guise of
exercising discretion. "
B. Role of Judiciary in Parental Rights Proceedings
Judicial discretion reigns supreme in visitation, custody
and termination of parental rights disputes." Society has of-
ten argued, however, that harmful judicial misperceptions
come to play in parental rights proceedings where one parent
is convicted of domestic murder." Specifically, the judiciary
has been known to (1) be reluctant in removing a child from its
parent's custody when a child has not directly witnessed a
domestic murder;" (2) prefer natural birth parents' rights,
even if incarcerated, over third party interests; 9 (3) discount
domestic murder, or fail to give it proper weight, when weigh-
ing the act against other state statutory factors;' ° and (4) fail
to issue visitation restrictions and/or supervised visitation
episodes despite the suspicion such restriction may be
necessary."'
" See Mark Strasser, Fit To Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion & Sexual Orien.
tation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 841 (1997).
56 See id. at 890-93.
" See supra text accompanying notes 19 and 55 (for a thorough discussion of
judicial misconceptions in determining parental rights disputes involving heterosex-
ual or homosexual parents).
See In re James M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976).
', See Cahn, supra note 19, at 1060.
60 See id. at 1060-61.
6'1 See id. at 1087-88.
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All of the above practices may exist because judges are
rarely adequately trained to fully understand the act of domes-
tic murder or the impact of domestic murder upon a child.62
In fact, lack of adequate judicial training in the realm of do-
mestic violence, in general, is often a hard-core reality. Vio-
lence between a child's parents, therefore, becomes a novel and
difficult factor for the courts,'s requiring the judiciary to ex-
amine the marital relationship." Courts, however, are often
reluctant to go beyond the marital and/or familial veil cloaking
the marital relationship as a certain degree of sanctity has
been attributed to it. This reluctance may result in members of
the judiciary focusing on parental behavior only when it direct-
ly affects the child at issue and rejecting evidence of violence
against the other parent.65 When limited training in the area
of domestic violence, including domestic murder, is often ig-
nored, judges may find the murder of a child's one parent by
his or her other parent to be irrelevant.6 This approach large-
ly ignores the psychological and sociological ramifications a
murderous act may have upon the parent-child relationship.67
It is improper, however, to place the charge of guilt fully upon
the judiciary as the judiciary often draws its perceptions from
societal beliefs. Specifically, judicial misconceptions may exist
because society, itself, does not want to intervene in the pri-
vate sphere of the family.
The torch of blame for the present line of inconsistent
judicial decision-making in the area of domestic murder may
be perpetually passed from varying state statutes, to an un-
62 Judicial enforcement of protections for battered women, for example, has
often been said to be influenced by common law heritage and cultural stereotypes
that treat wives as the property of their husbands and, therefore, seemingly sanc-
tion wife abuse. Id. at 1097; see also Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for
Gender Fairness in the Courts, Final Report, reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 825, 933 (1989) (even when properly set forth through the legislature, the
judiciary may choose not to impose limits on visitation due to their failure to
understand the ramifications of domestic violence).
See Cahn, supra note 19, at 1097.
See id. at 1082.
65 See id. at 1084.
61 See id. at 1093. (citing Public Hearing on HRB 1781 Before the Pennsylvania
House Committee on Youth and Aging, 1989 Sess. (statement of Judy Yupavage,
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence)).
6 A more detailed discussion of the psychological, physical and emotional rami-
fications of domestic violence upon child victims is discussed infra in Part V.
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trained judiciary, to societal stereotypes and back again. This
torch, however, should be extinguished and the torch of uni-
form state recognition ignited if the needs of child victims of
domestic murder are to be adequately addressed. Unless state
courts act to uniformly recognize the implications of domestic
murder to a child victim, what will likely remain will be an
exhausting, yet inconclusive, array of case law that neither
adequately addresses the seriousness of the issue nor protects
the rights of children involved. Perhaps it is here that Massa-
chusetts has taken up the charge and taken on the role of
catalyst, attempting to produce a nationwide reaction.
II. THE DRAMA AND DILEMMA OF LIZZIE'S LAW
A. The Drama of Lizzie's Law
The Massachusetts' State Legislature's passage of Lizzie's
Law provides child victims of domestic murder with the first
ever legal right to say "No" to their convicted parent's unwel-
come request for forced visitation. Prior to the enactment of
Lizzie's Law,6 8 no child protection act, statute or law existed
in the State of Massachusetts that would have prevented, even
in light of a child's opposition, visitation rights from being
granted to a parent who was convicted of the first degree mur-
der 9 of his or her child's other parent. Lizzie's Law, however,
is not only ground-breaking legislation within the State of
Massachusetts. It is the first law of its kind in the nation.7"
As such, Lizzie's Law has become an emerging model for com-
parison throughout the United States, with New York, Wash-
ington, California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Texas,
" Lizzie's Law was enacted by unanimous vote. See Henriette Campagne,
"Lizzie's Law" Unanimously Approved, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 18, 1997, at 3.
"9 See MASS. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.03 (1997) (when a murder is committed
with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or
cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable with
death or imprisonment for life there exists murder in the first degree).
"0 This Author believes the sense of urgency attributed to the enactment of
Lizzie's Law may have been based upon several factors, namely, the result of long-
term third party frustrations over the court system's demonstrated reluctance to
focus solely on the act of domestic murder in determining parental rights disputes,
a sense of overdue national relevance or perhaps simply the emotional appeal (for
politicians seeking reelection) of a child protection statute.
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Indiana, Arizona, Georgia, Delaware, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois,
Michigan, Florida and Rhode Island requesting copies from the
Massachusetts State Legislature so as to develop their own
similar child protection acts.7 Thus, Lizzie's Law's dramatic
arrival upon the family law scene has not only unprecedented
but also potentially far-reaching effects.
1. Massachusetts' Rationale for Recognizing a Child's
Voice in the Specific Instance of First Degree
Domestic Murder
The Massachusetts State Legislature prefaced Lizzie's Law
with an emergency preamble that immediately pushed the law
into effect, thereby prohibiting a forced visitation petition sub-
mitted by a domestic murderer from ever being unexpectedly
granted.72 This emergency enactment was the direct result of
the legislative belief that deferred operation of the law would
defeat its purpose. It may also have been, however, the result
of third party7 fear of an impending judicial ruling in favor of
7' Telephone Interview with Paul E. Caron, Representative, Massachusetts
House of Representatives (February 2, 1998) [hereinafter Feb. Interview with
Caron].
In early 1998, U.S. Senator John F. Kerry began exploring ways in which
Congress could enact a national version of Lizzie's Law. Similar to the strategic
drive behind Megan's Law (legislation requiring notification of the surrounding
general public when a convicted sex-offender moves into a neighborhood), Senator
Kerry proposed that the federal government encourage each state to enact a child
protection act similar to that of Lizzie's Law in order for said state to qualify for
federal grant. For reasons unknown to this Author, Senator Kerry recently aban-
doned these efforts.
" Lizzie's Law emergency preamble states: "Whereas, The deferred operation of
this act would tend to defeat its purpose, which is to prohibit court ordered visita-
tion rights to certain persons convicted of first degree murder, therefore it is here-
by declared to be an emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation of
the public convenience." H.B. 4689, Ch. 77, 1997 First Annual Session (Mass.
1997) (prohibiting court ordered visitation rights to certain persons convicted of
first degree domestic murder).
The emergency preamble was added to Lizzie's Law in an effort to, but not
limited to, deliberately curb Charles Thompson's efforts to obtain a formal court
order affirming his request for visitation. As of the date of the enactment, Mr.
Thompson had not yet formally filed for forced visitation. Had Lizzie's Law failed
to be enacted with an emergency preamble, however, the law would have not
taken effect until 90 days later thereby giving Mr. Thompson ample time to effec-
tuate his request through the court system.
"' This Author uses the term "third party custodial representatives" to repre-
sent legal guardians or custodians of the child victim who are often relatives of
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forced visitation.'4 The risk of encountering and relying upon
a judge who might be aberrant enough to overlook the pleas of
a child and grant visitation rights to a convicted parent has
continually been cause for alarm. On this note, third party
custodial representatives in Massachusetts voiced concern as to
the physical, psychological, and emotional ramifications forced
visitation produced upon the well-being of child victims. 5 The
above factors encouraging emergency enactment were further
supplemented by increasing numbers of domestic murder cases
mirroring the Lizzie Thompson case (and their varied judicial
resolutions). 6 The Massachusetts case of David Murphy vivid-
ly illustrates this latter concern.
Similar to Lizzie Thompson, during August of 1993, two
and a half year old David Murphy witnessed his father Robert
Murphy bludgeon, choke and stab to death his mother Patricia
Gordon Aquino." Subsequent to Robert Murphy's conviction
and sentence of life imprisonment, he requested that the court,
over his sons' objections, decree that both David and his broth-
er Damian visit him in prison. 8 Robert Murphy's visitation
request was denied. However, the rationale behind the judicial
denial became the subject of concern for third party interests.
Specifically, the judge ruled against Murphy's request for
forced visitation not because of Murphy's conviction in the
death of his sons' mother or Murphy's sons' objections to his
visitation request but because Murphy had "left the children
unattended, causing risk of neglect." 9 Arguing that the court
relied primarily upon the issue of "neglect" so as to deny Rob-
ert Murphy access to his sons, third party custodial interests"
the murdered parent retaining custody or guardianship of the child victim.
74 See Strasser, supra note 55, at 842.
See discussion infra Part V.
76 See discussion supra Part IA.-B.
77 See Leslie Miller, Lawmakers Hear Plea for Passage of "Lizzie's Law," PATRI-
OT LEDGER, July 1, 1997, at 3; see also Jordana Hart, Custody Battle Compounds
Boy's Loss, THE BOSTON GLOBE, January 21, 1999, at B1; Lauren Markoe,
Granddad Pleads for Quincy Boy, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, December 30, 1998; and
Dianne Williamson, Killer of Dad is Ill-Suited to be One--"Sperm Donor" Souza in
Cruel Bid to Access Kids, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, September 13, 1998.
78 See id.
' See id.
8' Third party representative herein was victim Patricia Gordon Aquino's sister,
Denise Gordon. See id.
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asserted that the court espoused a questionable and unsound
decision-making rationale which would be of clear detriment to
future child victims of domestic murder.
In addition to the above factors encouraging the enactment
of Lizzie's Law, the implications of long-term judicial tenure
may have been of some concern. In Massachusetts, family
court judges are appointed until the age of retirement at 70.81
As such, they are not subject to recall and are not required to
publicly campaign for reelection.82 Due to their extended
terms, those members of the judiciary appointed twenty, thirty
or forty years ago (an era when domestic violence was little un-
derstood and/or recognized) would likely have continued in
their failure to adequately recognize domestic murder as a
serious matter requiring judicial intervention. This fact, cou-
pled with the nonexistent goal of reelection may have left
many in the Massachusetts Legislature with the belief that
there failed to exist any viable impetus for Massachusetts'
long-term judges to alter any dated, stereotypical beliefs that
they may have acquired concerning domestic violence (i.e, that
the curtain of family life should remain drawn to judicial or
public scrutiny).' As the implications of long-term judicial
tenure might possibly impact upon Massachusetts' courts visi-
tation and custody decisions in a seemingly negative way, with
children's fate appearing to be left to the whim of the court
system, Lizzie's Law was thereby enacted.
B. The Dilemma of Lizzie's Law
Despite the seemingly fervent impetus for enactment,
Lizzie's Law has been, and continues to be, the subject of sub-
stantial controversy and opposition. Specifically, special inter-
est groups, including divorce attorneys and Fathers' National
Rights Groups, argue that Lizzie's Law removes the role of the
judge in parental rights disputes, replacing him or her with
the desire of a minor child.' These groups further argue that
a parent who is incarcerated following a conviction in the
"i See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1995 68, 73, 75, 76 (1996).
,2 See Feb. Interview with Caron, supra note 71.
8' See Cahn, supra note 19, at 1044.
8' See Feb. Interview with Caron, supra note 71.
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death of his or her child's other parent has satisfactorily paid
their debt to society through their incarcerationY Thus, by
allowing Massachusetts' courts to suspend visitation privileges
of parents convicted of first degree domestic murder, the above
groups and their supporters opine that Lizzie's Law represents
a form of second punishment thereby running afoul of double
jeopardy jurisprudence.
In addition to the above, critics of Lizzie's Law urge that
the law, along with similar child protection acts, will establish
a dangerous precedent with the public at large who may subse-
quently seek to curb the parental rights of other "convicted"
parents such as, for example, drug abusers.' Moreover, critics
allege that by allowing states to mandate suspension of visita-
tion rights upon conviction of first degree domestic murder, a
chipping away at the basic constitutional protections afforded
to parental rights will undeniably occur. 8 Finally, critics as-
sert that the implementation of Lizzie's Law will ultimately act
to reduce the success rate of prison rehabilitation programs as
a prisoner's incentive for self-betterment, i.e., visitation privi-
leges with his or her child, will be removed, rendering rehabili-
tation a lackluster endeavor.89
The above arguments have been rejected by Lizzie's Law
supporters who argue that Lizzie's Law and other similar child
protection acts do not remove the role of the judge in child
visitation disputes but instead supply an additional legal pro-
tection safeguarding the wishes and best interests of the child
victim." Further, while supporters espouse their belief that,
by virtue of the violent crime which occurred, the parent con-
See id.
" Fifth Amendment guarantee, enforceable against states through Fourteenth
Amendment, protects against second prosecution for the same offense after acquit-
tal or conviction and against multiple punishments for same offense. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 491 (6th ed. 1990).
Note: Battered women's advocates have expressed their concern that Lizzie's
Law may, in fact, harm those women suffering from domestic abuse who subse-
quently kill their abusers (their child's other parent), by possibly denying them
visitation access to their child in the confusing aftermath of the murder. See dis-
cussion infra Part IV.D.
'7 See Feb. Interview with Caron, supra note 71.
" See id.
80 See id.
80 See Telephone Interview with Colleen Mastine, Senate Aide, New York State
Senate (Oct. 1, 1997) [hereinafter Interview with Mastine].
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victed of murdering his or her child's other parent has lost his
or her claim to parental rights, they do not agree with Lizzie's
Law being touted as a form of double jeopardy. Supporters'
reasoning extends to the fact that courts implementing Lizzie's
Law will not in any way prevent visitation if the child is of age
to assent to such visitation."1 Proponents, therefore, assert
that Lizzie's Law acts not as a second punishment but merely
as a remedial9 2 measure for the protection of children in-
volved in parental murder situations. 3 Finally, while Lizzie's
Law supporters may acknowledge the alleged risks to the
rights of parents, they argue that the ends justify the means;
namely, when the rights of domestic murderers are weighed
against the rights of child victims, the child victims come
first.94
C. Balancing Lizzie's Law Against State and Constitutional
Doctrines
1. Parens Patriae
Notwithstanding the aforementioned arguments, a larger
threshold inquiry exists as to whether Lizzie's Law takes the
state doctrine of parens patriaes5 too far and whether a state
government may impair the fundamental right of childrearing
of those parents convicted of first degree domestic murder
without violating their constitutional rights under the Due
Process, Substantive Due Process and/or Equal Protection Clauses.
9 The question remains, however, whether Lizzie's Law may be deemed a form
of second punishment for convicted parents of those children who are not of suit-
able age to signify their assent to visitation. See problems discussed infra in Part
W.B.
' "Remedial" may be defined as that which is designed to correct any existing
law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public
good; a legislative action giving a party a mode of remedy for a wrong, where said
party had none, or a different one, than before. See In re Estate of McCracken,
224 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio 1967).
" See supra note 71; see also In re Female S., 111 Misc. 2d 313, 444 N.Y.S.2d
829 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (similar to within situation, New York statuto-
ry scheme for the termination of parental rights is not intended as punishment
but rather should be seen as a protective measure for a destitute and dependent
child).
" See supra note 71.
95 See KRAMER, supra note 18, § 1.02.
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Prior to undertaking the above analysis, a brief examina-
tion of the constitutionality of parental rights is warranted.
The Supreme Court has in recent years acknowledged that a
person's decision concerning the manner in which to conduct
his or her family life may be deemed a fundamental right.96
Specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized a parental (or
childrearing) right of parents under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which includes, but is not limited to, the areas of reli-
gion, citizenship (including morals), and sexual issues.97 The
state doctrine of parens patriae," however, allows a state to
usurp this childrearing right whenever a compelling state need
exists to protect a child's interests." Specifically, where there
may be evidence that parental choices will jeopardize the
health and safety of a child, the doctrine of parens patriae may
make parental rights subject to limitation.. as the protection
of a child's vulnerability is of compelling interest to the
state.'O' More specific to the issue at hand, the Supreme
Court has noted that the state may burden the childrearing
right of parents so as to protect the physical, mental and emo-
tional health of children. 02 A violation of the doctrine of pa-
rens patriae by individual states has been found only where
the state interference has a coercive effect,0 3 namely, where
the governmental action is unquestioningly mandatory and
provides no outlet for the parents.' 4 This does not appear to
be the case with Lizzie's Law which provides an outlet for the
9 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1979).
'7 See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622 (parental consent to abortion); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (religious objection to compulsory school attendance);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (religious freedom); Meyer v. Nebras-
ka, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (educational choices); In re Alfonso v. Fernandez, 195
A.D.2d 46, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't 1993) (category of sexual issues has devel-
oped gradually, often being considered an area of parental control protected by the
Constitution).
00 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
00 See id.
100 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
'o' See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
101 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67.
103 See Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding rights of parents
not infringed by family planning-the -practice of distributing contraceptives to
minors without notice to parents).
.04 See Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995) (find-
ing no violation of rights when school distributed condoms to students).
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parents, represented by their child's assent to visitation. Thus,
as opposed to taking the state doctrine of parens patriae too
far, Lizzie's Law reasonably recognizes and utilizes said doc-
trine in the circumstance of domestic murder.
2. Due Process and Equal Protection
Despite the seemingly proper assumption of the doctrine of
parens patriae, the question remains as to whether Lizzie's
Law impairs the constitutional childrearing right of parents.
Prior to reviewing what due process, substantive due process
and/or equal protection protections are available under Lizzie's
Law, an examination is warranted as to what due process
protections are mandated by the courts in every-day parental
rights proceedings (i.e., visitation, custody and/or termination).
In Santosky v. Kramer,"5 the United States Supreme
Court clearly defined the procedural due process protections
afforded parents facing termination of parental rights, namely,
parental rights may not be terminated absent a showing, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is "unfit.""6
Governing termination proceedings by a clear and convincing
standard, the Santosky Court considered the risk of erroneous
factual determinations attributed to parental rights proceed-
ings. 7 Specifically, parental rights proceedings often employ
imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations
open to the subjective values of the judiciary.0 8 Moreover,
such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on
cultural or class bias.'0 9 The reason for such vulnerability
may be attributed to the "difficulty associated with these cases,
such as ... the complicated feelings children may have about
their parents' confinement and the need to make special ar-
105 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
106 See Philip M. Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Parents
in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM.
L. 757, 764 (1991) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); see also
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
and Susan E. Simanek, State Must Offer Clear and Convincing Proof of Unfitness
to Cut Off Parental Rights, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 585 (1983).
Io See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757, 768-70.
i Id. at 762-63, 769.
"0 See id.
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rangements for visitation."" Faced with such fragile situa-
tions, courts may attempt to run roughshod over due process
interests of incarcerated parents, writing them off as unfit."'
By using a clear and convincing evidence standard, courts have
attempted to eradicate such over-simplification."2 Procedural
due process protections in termination proceedings also com-
monly mandate that the parent affected thereby be allowed a
proceeding before a neutral fact-finder. Procedural protocol
before this fact-finder becomes murky, however, when address-
ing the question of whether to recognize past crimes as proof of
parental unfitness. Courts differ in their opinions. Critics as-
sert that any acknowledgment of a parent's past crime as per
se proof of parental "unfitness" in termination proceedings flies
in the face of constitutional protections to be afforded to con-
victed parents under due process."' In contrast, supporters
argue that crimes involving the murder of one parent by the
child's other parent inevitably cause lasting damage to the par-
ent-child relationship." As such, these crimes may be so rep-
rehensible that the possibility of the convicted parent ever
again providing the child with the intangible qualities of a
positive, nurturing family relationship may be nonexistent."5
Thus, supporters conclude that as the parent-child relationship
is likely beyond repair due to the domestic murder, parental
rights should be severed despite running the risk of infringing
upon the convicted parent's constitutional due process
rights.1
16
A similar discussion ensues with regard to procedural
safeguards employed in custody and visitation proceedings.
Due process procedural protections in custody disputes man-
110 See Genty, supra note 106, at 770.
1" See Genty, supra note 106, at 770.
1 See Genty, supra note 106, at 781.
" Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972) (holding that termination of
parental rights on the basis of past criminal conduct flies in face of practice that
courts should not presume an incarcerated parent is unfit, either implicitly or
explicitly); see also Genty, supra note 106, at 797 (the judge must go "beyond the
facts of the parent's crime" and determine the extent to which that crime impairs
the parent-child relationship today).
114 See Genty, supra note 106, at 803.
.. See Genty, supra note 106, at 803.
... See Genty, supra note 106, at 804.
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date court hearings to evaluate the fitness of each parent. 7
and to determine what environment may be within the child's
best interests."8 This best interest test carries over to deter-
minations governing visitation."9 A court, therefore, is pri-
marily charged with considering the best interests of a child
and making orders for custody and visitation that will promote
the child's welfare. When determining visitation requests from
incarcerated individuals, however, certain state courts have
found that prisoners may lack an inherent "liberty" or "proper-
ty" interest in being able to meet with visitors, even their own
family members. 2 ' As such, visitation privileges of incarcer-
ated individuals may sometimes not require strict due process
safeguards unless state law or prison regulations explicitly
render prisoners entitled to such visitation. 2'
Based upon the above review, it is unlikely that Lizzie's
Law would infringe upon the due process rights of parents
convicted of first degree domestic murder. First, Lizzie's Law is
not a permanent blanket ban on all prison visitation, which
might readily implicate the protection of the due process
clause.'22 Instead, it is a much more precise and individual
temporary suspension of visitation rights which is lifted the
moment the child assents to visitation. Second, similar to the
due process protections mandated by the Santosky court in
termination proceedings, Lizzie's Law affords protection in that
it similarly mandates some finding of parental unfitness,
namely, the conviction of a parent for first degree domestic
murder. Third, hearing requirements under Lizzie's Law may
be adequately met by both the convicted parent's criminal trial
(and constitutional protections afforded therein (i.e., the right
to counsel, jury trial, protection against self-incrimination)"=
and the subsequent procedural evaluation of a neutral fact-
finder with regard to the separate issue of visitation.'24 Thus,
1.. See Cahn, supra note 19, at 1058-59.
... See id. at 1059.
119 See id.
... See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
121 See id.
12 See id. at 465 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
12 See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, VII.
124 The stringent procedural protections afforded to convicted parents in the
criminal courts are actually more extensive than those afforded parents in regular
parental rights termination proceedings under civil law.
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Lizzie's Law would likely not violate a parent's constitutional
rights under the Due Process Clause.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
addition to addressing the procedural safeguards discussed
above, acts as a limitation upon the substantive power of state
legislatures to regulate various areas of the public's economic
and noneconomic life.'" The doctrine which relies on the
Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a state regulation is
commonly called the substantive due process doctrine. 6 Un-
der this doctrine, courts can engage in a detailed analysis to
determine if a noneconomic fundamental right has been im-
properly impaired by a state statute. In the substantive due
process area, those rights established by the Supreme Court as
fundamental have tended to be in the related areas of sex,
marriage, childbearing and childrearing. 27 Where a court
finds such fundamental rights to be impaired, it applies a
strict scrutiny level of review, namely, the state's objective
must be compelling and the relation between that objective
and the means must be very close so the means can be said to
be necessary to achieve the ends.'28 In the within matter,
Massachusetts may be said to be impairing childrearing by
prohibiting incarcerated parents convicted of first degree do-
mestic murder a chance to visit with their children. However,
the state's objective-protecting the vulnerability of child vic-
tims of domestic murder from further physical or emotional
scarring brought about by forced visitation-may be deemed of
a compelling nature.29 Moreover, as no other means exist
within Massachusetts law which would supply such protection,
the means chosen to achieve such protection, i.e., temporary
suspension of visitation privileges, may be said to be neces-
sary. Thus, as Lizzie's Law may be found to meet even a strict
scrutiny review, it would likely survive a constitutional attack
based upon substantive due process grounds.
12 See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
126 See id.
121 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) (establishing the
right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children); see also
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (establishing the right of parents to commit
their child to a mental institution).
128 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 515.
12 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
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The Equal Protection Clause is found within the Four-
teenth Amendment as well and as such, is limited to state
action.' The clause guarantees that people who are similar-
ly situated will be treated similarly and that no state shall
make or enforce any law which shall deny to any person equal
protection of the laws.'"' As such, the Equal Protection
Clause imposes a general restraint on (1) governmental use of
classifications, not just classifications based on race but also
those based on sex, alienage, illegitimacy, wealth or any other
classification'32 and (2) governmental impairment of any fun-
damental rights.33
A review of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of
this Note is imperative as the question must be whether the
government has behaved reasonably in setting up the
classification of "first degree domestic murderers" and saying
that all first degree domestic murderers must give up their
visitation rights unless their child assents.'34 As discussed
supra, the Supreme Court has established that parents retain
a fundamental right to raise and care for their children."5
13 The Fourteenth Amendment constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws means that no persons or class of person shall be denied the same pro-
tection of the laws that is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like cir-
cumstances in their lives, liberty, property, and in their pursuit of happiness.
Moreover, equal protection prohibits a state from denying to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws thereby requiring that persons in-
volved in similar circumstances be given equal protection in the enjoyment of
personal rights and the redress of wrongs. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (6th ed.
1990).
131 See Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
' See City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
133 See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
13 Notwithstanding recent Supreme Court case law recognizing childrearing as
an arguably fundamental right, individual rights deemed fundamental have tradi-
tionally been the right to vote, the right of access to the courts, and the right to
migrate interstate. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to migrate
interstate); Harper, 383 U.S. at 663 (right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (right of access to court system).
"30 See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (constitu-
tional protection is afforded to family relationships and childrearing); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (termination of parental rights interferes with a
fundamental liberty interest and state is required to exercise fundamentally fair
procedures when destroying familial bonds); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv.,
452 U.S. 18 (1981) ("decisions have by now made plain ... that a parent's desire
for and right to the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her
children is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection." (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
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While this right is not absolute,'1 6 it cannot be abridged by
the state unless the state can bear an especially high burden of
justification for the infringement.'37 When a fundamental
right is impaired, the Equal Protection Clause requires a strict
level of scrutiny.3 This strict scrutiny review requires that
the state's action be both necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental purpose as well as narrowly drawn.'39 The sus-
pension of visitation rights mandated by Lizzie's Law must,
therefore, serve a compelling state interest. Courts reviewing
similar equal protection queries (e.g., state statutes terminat-
ing parental rights due to parental mental illness or parental
mental retardation which may act to harm the child) have
unequivocally responded that no equal protection violation has
occurred. 40 Since the Supreme Court has held that a state
645, 651 (1972))); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (childrearing is
liberty interest guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment).
... See In re J.M.J., 379 N.W.2d 816 (S.D. 1986) (despite parents' fundamental
right to their children, it is not an absolute and conditional right); In Interest of
J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994) (natural parents' rights are not absolute; pro-
tection of the child is paramount); In re Sumey, 621 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1980)
(parent's constitutional rights fail to afford absolute protection against state inter-
ference with the family relationship).
'37 See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446 (12th ed. 1991).
13 Some favor the intermediate scrutiny test (a less stringent level of review)
in the area of childrearing wherein a determination is made as to whether the
statute set forth by the legislature is substantially related to an important govern-
ment objective. Proponents assert that where a child suffers harm from witnessing
domestic violence, the state's interest in protecting the child is sufficiently strong
and the violent parent's interest in continuing the conduct sufficiently weak, the
application of intermediate scrutiny is warranted. See, e.g., Amy Haddix, Unseen
Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic Violence on Children Through Stat-
utory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 CAL. L. REV. 757 (1996). Even consider-
ing Lizzie's Law under such intermediate scrutiny, Lizzie's Law would surely sur-
vive such analysis.
139 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
1" See, e.g., In re Nereida S., 57 N.Y.2d 636, 439 N.E.2d 870, 454 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1982) (scheme which states that parental rights should be terminated when par-
ent is presently and for foreseeable future unable, due to mental illness, to pro-
vide proper and adequate care for their child-when said scheme provides signifi-
cant procedural safeguards for the natural parent's rights and authorizes termina-
tion of parental rights only when specific criteria are met and when necessary in
the best interest of the child-does not violate Equal Protection Clause); see also
In re Sylvia M., 82 A.D.2d 217, 83 A.D.2d 925, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dep't 1981)
(class created by this section concerning termination of parental rights in case of
mentally ill parent does not include all mentally ill parents but only those whose
children would be in danger of suffering neglect if returned to them, and differ-
ence in treatment is not between all mentally ill and all sane parents but between
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has both a legitimate and compelling interest in the vulnera-
bility, safety and welfare of children,"" Massachusetts may
be found to meet the first prong of the equal protection strict
scrutiny review. Moreover, Lizzie's Law may be deemed neces-
sary due to the Legislature's and judiciary's consistent failure
to recognize through enactment of protective legislation and
proper interpretation, respectively, the detrimental ramifica-
tions that both domestic murder and subsequent forced visita-
tion have upon a child victim. Also, Lizzie's Law may be said
to be narrowly drawn in that a convicted parent's visitation
rights are not suspended indefinitely, or even within a given
statutory time frame, but only until such time as the child
victim freely assents to visitation. Finally, while Lizzie's Law
may appear discriminatory, a discriminatory effect alone is not
enough to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Any allegation
of legislative discriminatory motive must be shown by evidence
of a history of discrimination. No such evidence exists. Thus,
based upon the foregoing, Lizzie's Law would likely survive a
constitutional attack resting upon equal protection grounds.
IIl. REVIEW OF NEW YORK'S ATTEMPT TO ENACT CHILD
PROTECTION ACT SIMILAR TO LIzzIE'S LAW
A. Discussion of New York's Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act
As discussed earlier in Part II, Lizzie's Law has become a
model for use throughout the United States with, to date, over
seventeen states drafting their own similar child protection
acts. 42 We will now examine New York's efforts to enact its
version of Lizzie's Law.
The issue of parental murder reached the State of New
York most directly through the plight of the Scaccia family.
parents who whether mentally ill or not can care for their children and those
parents who are so mentally ill that they cannot, and in view of the substantial
interest of the state and strict standards of clear and convincing quantum of proof
required for termination, this section does not violate equal protection); and
Berman v. Helen H., 49 A.D.2d 327, 374 N.Y.S.2d 693 (2d Dep't 1975).
141 See In re R.B., 566 A.2d 1310 (Vt. 1989) (state has an interest in the safety
and welfare of the child); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (state
has "duty" to protect children through judicial determinations of their interests).
1 See generally Feb. Interview with Caron, supra note 71.
1 See Case, supra note 17.
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Cole Cruz was three years of age when he and one of his sis-
ters witnessed their father Larry Cruz stab their mother Lee-
Anne Scaccia Cruz to death.'" Larry Cruz was found guilty
of second degree murder. Following incarceration, Cruz re-
quested that his children-Cole and twin daughters Amanda
and Natalie-visit him in prison for six hours every other
weekend.45  In June, 1997, the court denied Cruz's
request 46 at the urging of Cole, Amanda, Natalie, their
grandparents and the children's therapist. Nonetheless, under
then-current New York law, Cruz could have re-petitioned for
visitation every six months. 47 Moreover, while courts are
generally charged with considering the best interests, safety
and welfare of the child at issue when making visitation or-
ders, at the time of this case there existed no statutory provi-
sion in the State of New York barring a court from granting a
petition for visitation which was been submitted by a parent
who is convicted of murdering his or her child's other parent,
even when the child objects. 4 Thus, New York drafted and
filed its own version of Lizzie's Law hereinafter termed the
"Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act."49
14 See id.
", See Interview with Mastine, supra note 90. Larry Cruz plead guilty to lesser
charge of second degree murder. Lee-Anne Cruz's parents, who retain custody of
the couple's children, agreed to a lesser sentence in exchange for allowing the
children to avoid being forced to testify to the slaying at trial. Id.
14 See id.
147 See id.
" See S. Mem. No. 11615-04-7, at 1 (N.Y. 1997).
4 The Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act was filed by Senator John DeFrancisco of
New York, 49th District, and provides:
Section 1: Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as
the "Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act".
§ 2. Section 240 of the domestic relations law is amended by adding
a new subdivision 1-C to read as follows:
1-C. (A). Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the
contrary, no court shall make an order providing for visitation or custody
to a person who has been convicted of murder in the first or second
degree in this state, or convicted of an offense in another jurisdiction
which, if committed in this state, would constitute either murder in the
first or second degree, of a parent, custodian or guardian of any child
who is the subject of the proceeding. Pending determination of a petition
for visitation or custody, such child shall not visit and no person shall
visit with such child present, such person who has been convicted of
murder in the first or second degree in this state, or convicted of an
offense in another jurisdiction which, if committed in this state, would
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Similar to Lizzie's Law, the Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act
does not bar a child from visiting the parent convicted of mur-
dering that child's other parent, if the child is of age to assent
to such visitation.50 The foremost impetus behind New
York's Act was removing child victims' burden of being re-
quired to repeatedly return to court to show that they should
not be forced to visit with their convicted parent when they do
not wish to do so.' 5 ' As the Act presently stands, New York
child victims of domestic murder will only have to act, by as-
senting, when they decide to reestablish, or continue, contact
with a convicted parent.'52 Where a court finds there is a mu-
tual desire for, and benefit to be realized from, reestablished
contact and visitation between the parent and child, the court
will institute a structure for communication. 5 3 Thus, similar
to Lizzie's Law, the Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act is based
upon the premise that repeated legal attempts by a convicted
parent to force visitation only act to repeatedly victimize the
child at issue.
The New York and Massachusetts' Acts differ, however, in
that the Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act prohibits forced visita-
tion to a parent convicted of either domestic murder in the first
constitute either murder in the first or second degree, of a parent, custo-
dian or guardian of such child without the consent of such child's custo-
dian or legal guardian.
(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (A) of this subdivision a court may
order visitation or custody where: (i) (a) such child is of suitable age to
signify assent and such child assents to such visitation or custody; or
(b) If such child is not of suitable age to signify assent, the
child's custodian or legal guardian assents to such order; or
(c) The person who has been convicted of murder in the first or
second degree, or of an offense in another jurisdiction which, if commit-
ted in this state, would constitute either murder in the first or second
degree, can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a
history of domestic violence committed by the victim of such murder
against such convicted person or a family or household member of either
party, as such family or household member is defined in Article Eight of
the Family Court Act, and that such history of domestic violence was a
substantial contributing factor in such murder; and
(II) The court finds that such visitation or custody is in the best
interests of the child.
S. 5799, 221st Leg., 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) [emphasis added].
150 Id.
.51 See Interview with Mastine, supra note 90.
152 Id.
" S. Mem. No. 11615-04-7, at 1 (N.Y. 1997).
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or second degree.154 This broadening in terms of degree of
conviction may be the result of the fact that New York penal
law restricts first degree murder convictions to instances of
murder involving state employees of title such as police offi-
cers, judges, peace officers, and/or employees of correctional
facilities.155  This penal definition differs greatly from
Massachusetts' definition of first degree murder which is not
restricted in any way to murder of state employees of title.'56
Recognizing the limitations which would exist, therefore, by
only addressing first degree domestic murder convictions, New
York's Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act included the broader cate-
gory of second degree domestic murder convictions as well.'57
The Acts also differ in that the New York Act covers custo-
dy determinations and recognizes equivalent crimes in other
states. Moreover, the Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act recognizes
as an exception to the law instances where the killer is a for-
mer victim of domestic violence. Thus, by including second
degree murder, including custody determinations and recogniz-
ing equivalent crimes in other states,' New York's Lee-Anne
Cruz Memorial Act has far surpassed the scope of protection
afforded by Massachusetts' Lizzie's Law.
A discussion of New York's Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act
would be incomplete, however, without examining New York's
past treatment of incarcerated parents involved in parental
rights proceedings (visitation, custody and termination). New
York has gained recognition as possessing a comprehensive
and constitutionally acceptable approach toward treatment of
parents, specifically incarcerated parents involved in parental
rights disputes.'59 Prior to termination of one's parental
1. See supra note 149.
1 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1996).
1 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 149. New York penal law defines second degree murder as
including, but not limited to, a defendant evincing a depraved indifference to hu-
man life whereby he or she recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of another person.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1996).
1 New York's inclusion of second degree murder in the Lee-Anne Cruz Memo-
rial Act, however, has not been without controversy, namely, the impact the inclu-
sion of second degree murder in this Act will have upon battered women and men
who kill their abusers, the co-parent of their child. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
... See Genty, supra note 106, at 828.
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rights, the State must prove certain allegations (otherwise
termed "extraordinary circumstances") by a strict standard of
clear and convincing evidence. 6 ° These extraordinary circum-
stances include: (1) death of both parents without lawful ap-
pointment of a guardian; (2) abandonment of the child for a
period of six months immediately prior to the date the termi-
nation petition is filed in the court; (3) inability of parents due
to mental illness or mental retardation to provide proper care
for a child, presently and for the foreseeable future, and said
child has been in the care of an authorized agency for a period
of one year immediately prior to the date the termination peti-
tion is filed with the court; (4) permanent neglect of the child;
or (5) severe or repeated abuse by the parent where the child
has been in the care of an authorized agency for the period of
one year immediately prior to the initiation of the termination
proceeding.'6 ' Prior to termination, New York law sometimes
requires a threshold showing that the agency seeking termina-
tion has exercised diligent efforts to repair, maintain and
strengthen the injured parental relationship.6 2 Such "diligent
efforts" refer to the agency's attempt to resolidify the ruptured
parent-child relationship by, but not limited to, arranging
rehabilitative services for the convicted parent, informing the
parent of his or her child's progress at appropriate intervals,
and making suitable arrangements with the correctional facili-
ty and other appropriate personnel for an incarcerated parent
to visit his or her child within the correctional facility.63 The
State's responsibility does not end here, however, as it further
retains affirmative duties to the child at issue when encourage-
ment of the parent-child relationship may be detrimental.'
160 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982).
161 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney 1997); see also Bennett v.
Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283 (N.Y. 1976) (New York Court of Appeals found that
a state may terminate parental rights if there is first a judicial finding of surren-
der, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect, unfortunate or involuntary extend-
ed disruption of custody, or other equivalent but rare extraordinary circumstances
which would drastically affect the welfare of the child. Most common allegations of
which incarcerated parents are found to be guilty of are abandonment or perma-
nent neglect).
16 See Genty, supra note 106, at 829. Diligent efforts are usually not required
where an agency is proceeding on grounds of parental abandonment.
16 See Genty, supra note 106, at 829.
'" See In re Matter of Jamie M., 63 N.Y.2d 388, 472 N.E.2d 311, 482 N.Y.S.2d
461 (1984) (consideration of the best interests of a child is usually considered only
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Specifically, diligent efforts on behalf of an incarcerated parent
are implemented to mend a torn parent-child relationship only
in the event such efforts are in the best interests of the
child. 16
New York employs similar safeguards in the areas of visi-
tation and custody. New York custody determinations look to
the fitness of the parents and then to the best interests of the
child at issue while visitation determinations largely look to
the best interests of the child.166 As such, arrangements for
an incarcerated parent to visit his or her child outside of a
correctional facility are not required unless it is within the
best interest of the child.167 Moreover, formulating arrange-
ments with correctional personnel for an incarcerated parent to
visit with his or her child within the confines of a facility is
done only when such visitation episodes are in the best inter-
ests of the child. 18 In fact, New York supplementary statute
commentary states that "where an agency has reason to be-
lieve that the continuation of a parent-child visitation [sched-
ule] in prison would cause imminent danger to the child or
would not be in the best interests of the child, the agency
should make a motion, on notice to all the attorneys [of re-
cord] ... requesting an order discontinuing visitation."69
when it would actually be detrimental to encourage and strengthen the parental
relationship).
"' Id.; see also N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(l)(b) (McKinney 1997) (It "is the
intent of the legislature in enacting this section to provide procedures not only as-
suring that the rights of the natural parent are protected, but also, where posi-
tive, nurturing parent-child relationships no longer exist, furthering the best inter-
ests, needs, and rights of the child by terminating parental rights ... ."); In re
Abdul W, 224 A.D.2d 875, 638 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1996) (where father re-
ceived extended prison sentence for shooting mother's paramour in child's presence
and experts recommended against forcing child to have any contact with father,
the court found that diligent efforts to maintain contact were no longer justified as
they would be injurious to the child at issue); Dickson v. Lascaris, 75 A.D.2d 47,
428 N.Y.S.2d 544 (4th Dep't 1980) (court's finding of abandonment, persistent ne-
glect or other extraordinary circumstances drastically affecting welfare of child,
trigger the best interest of the child test and will determine the future custody of
the child even though event may have taken place in the past).
6 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney 1997).
1' See id.
1 See id.
169 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384-b (McKinney 1997) (Joseph R. Carrieri,
Supp. Prac. Comm. 1996).
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As a result of New York's comprehensive approach toward
the treatment of all parents, incarcerated or not, involved in
parental rights disputes, New York's enactment of the Lee-
Anne Cruz Memorial Act is not surprising. What is surprising
is that even in such a fair environment, proponents of the Act
have met much resistance. Prisoners' rights advocates believe
the Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act is a "one size fits all" ap-
proach to a system where each case is fact specific.1 70 Other
opponents of the Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act assert that the
Act crosses into the realm of double jeopardy.' Supporters
rebut this argument asserting that the Act is not a form of sec-
ond punishment but is a legal mechanism removing the burden
borne by child victims of domestic murder of repeatedly having
to appear before the courts so as to protest their convicted
parent's unwelcome requests for visitation. 72 Supporters
have fortified their position by asserting that the Lee-Anne
Cruz Memorial Act will assist not only the child victims in
their legal battles but also surviving members of the crime
victim's family, who are likely held responsible for funding a
child victim's court appearances and, as such, are also consid-
ered to be victims suffering in the aftermath of a domestic
murder.73 Finally, supporters argue that it is the responsi-
bility of the court not only to make judgments on custody and
visitation that do not harm the welfare or happiness of the
child but also to recognize that the wishes of the crime victims
should have precedence over those of the criminal.' 4
The Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act, hereinafter termed
"Lee-Anne's Law," was signed into law by New York Gov.
George Pataki on July 7, 1998.'
... See Erik Kriss, New Law Signed as a Family Looks On, Relatives of Murder
Victim Lee-Anne Cruz Witness the Signing of a Measure Limiting the Custody and
Visitation Rights of Parents Who Kill the Other Parent, THE POST-STANDARD, July
8, 1998, at B1.
... See Interview with Mastine, supra note 90.
" See S. Mem. No. 11615-04-7, at 1 (N.Y. 1997).
17 See id.
174 See id.
17. See supra note 170.
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IV. INTERPRETING THE LANGUAGE OF LIzzIE's LAW
As discussed, states nationwide are attempting to draft
individual versions of child protection acts similar to Lizzie's
Law. Shadowing these drafting sessions is the conflicting
vision that Lizzie's Law may be seen as both a saving grace in
the field of children's rights legislation and as a possible trou-
blemaker in future judicial decision-making. This dichotomy
exists as a result of the fact that the commendable principles
supporting Lizzie's Law are, themselves, supported by ambigu-
ous language which is narrowly drawn and subject to varying
interpretations. Thus, in interpreting and revising the lan-
guage of Lizzie's Law so as to meet each state's particular
needs, individual states must recognize the challenge that lies
within Lizzie's Law and implement revisions within the lan-
guage of subsequent acts which will clarify and strengthen the
foundation of the law.
A. Addressing Commendable Principles
Notwithstanding Massachusetts' praiseworthy recognition
of the voice of child victims of domestic murder, of notable
commendation within Lizzie's Law is the fact that nowhere in
its language does one find the requirement that killer and
victim be married.'76 As such, Lizzie's Law recognizes an
individual's role and responsibility as parent regardless of
whether the institution of marriage has ever been solemnized.
Moreover, Lizzie's Law does not mandate that the child actual-
ly view the killing of his or her parent in order to find shelter
under the law. 7' It may be argued that where a child is not a
direct witness to a domestic murder, the facts of the case may
not be as clear as where a child is a direct witness to the
17 The original statutory language which prohibited forced visitation where the
parent was convicted of killing his or her "spouse" was deliberately changed in the
enacted version of Lizzie's Law to the present term "parent" so that the victim
and the convicted parent did not have to be married in order for Lizzie's Law to
apply. See Telephone Interview with Paul E. Caron, Representative, Massachusetts
House of Representatives (Oct. 2, 1997) [hereinafter Oct. Interview with Caron].
17 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. This is in direct contrast to the
particular circumstances surrounding the cases of Lizzie Thompson, David Murphy
and Cole Cruz where the child victims were present and direct witnesses at the
scene of the crime.
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event. Lizzie's Law rejects this assertion. The law recognizes
that whether a child is affected directly, by viewing the mur-
der, or indirectly, by permanent parental loss, he or she has
been equally injured. 7 s Further note should be taken of the
fact that a parent is affected by Lizzie's Law only in the event
he or she is convicted of the crime of first degree domestic
murder. Should a parent be involved in anything short of con-
viction (e.g., arraignment, under suspicion, held for question-
ing, etc.), Lizzie's Law would not extend to that situation. By
limiting the application of Lizzie's Law to instances of actual
conviction, Lizzie's Law not only reinforces the belief of inno-
cent until proven guilty but also reaffirms the constitutional
belief in the value of parental rights 79 and the protection of
the parent-child relationship. 8 ' Based upon the foregoing,
Lizzie's Law may be said to be built upon a foundation of com-
mendable principles which recognize equally both the convicted
parent's and the child victim's rights.
B. Addressing Ambiguous Language and Limited Construction
As hinted upon earlier, a large degree of the weakness
inherent in Lizzie's Law may be found in its ambiguous lan-
guage and limited construction. This Note suggests addressing
these problem areas and subsequently rectifying them through
amendment, thereby rendering Lizzie's Law a more appropri-
ate model for other similar newly drafted child protection
legislation.
Addressing ambiguous language, the terminology utilized
by the Massachusetts State Legislature in drafting Lizzie's
Law is subject to varying judicial interpretations. Specifically,
the Legislature failed to define key terms within the law, such
as "parent," "suitable age," and "assent."8'
17 Children living in close proximity to violence suffer severe emotional conse-
quences, even if they do not directly witness the abuse. See Haddix, supra note
138, at 785.
17 See discussion supra Part H.C.
10" See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982). The Supreme Court in
Santosky stated "[slome losses cannot be measured .... Itihe judge's finding
[against the parent] effectively foreclosed the possibility that [the child] would ever
know his natural parents." Id. at 761 n.11.
. See supra note 16. Author notes that the Massachusetts' Legislature is
currently considering expanding Lizzie's Law to include second degree murder,
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The query remains unanswered as to whether the term
"parent"18 2 includes only natural birth parents or also adop-
tive parents, long-term foster parents, and couples (married or
common law"s married) who take on the role of parent to
their partner's child without ever actually adopting that child.
Further questions exist as to whether the term "parent" ap-
plies where same-sex couples adopt children or where one
member of a same-sex couple has a child from an earlier het-
erosexual relationship to whom a new same-sex partner be-
comes a parental figure. More directly, if the term "parent" is
gender specific"8 (meaning one parent must be male and one
parent must be female), this would render children of same-sex
couples without redress in the instance of domestic murder
and thus subject to forced visitation.
A similar inquiry exists with regard to the term "suitable
age." Lizzie's Law states that a court shall not force a child to
visit his or her parent unless the child is of "suitable age" to
assent to visitation.8 5 This term, however, is not properly de-
fined. Nowhere is it illustrated how "suitable" may be deter-
mined, namely, what factors or criteria establish suitability
and/or what agency, court officer, psychological expert, other
court-appointed individual or third party custodial representa-
tive, if any, makes the determination as to suitability. For
example, at age two a child does not assent to visitation with
his incarcerated father. At age five the child enters school,
suffers from peer embarrassment due to the lack of a father
figure (who remains incarcerated following his conviction for
domestic murder), and thereby assents to reinstate visitation
attempted murder or conspiracy to commit murder. House Bill No. 3100 was
introduced by Representative Paul Caron in January, 1999.
1"2 Parent merely defined as father or mother. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD POCKET
DIcTIONARY 209 (2d ed. 1993).
" Common law marriage commonly involves mutual agreement to enter into a
marriage relationship, cohabitation sufficient to warrant fulfillment of the neces-
sary relationship of man and wife and an open assumption of marital duties and
obligations. See Marshall v. State, 537 P.2d 423, 429 (Okla. 1975); see also
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 277 (6th ed. 1990) (marital living not solemnized in ordi-
nary way (i.e., non-ceremonial) but created by an agreement to marry, followed by
cohabitation).
18 Gender specific classification might also imply an equal protection violation.
With gender, an intermediate scrutiny standard would apply (law upheld must be
substantially related to an important government purpose).
" See supra note 16.
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with the convicted father. Does the five year old child's peer-
induced decision to change his prior position indicate a sudden
emotional/mental maturity rendering him of "suitable age" to
reinstate visitation? Lizzie's Law's failure to set forth the nec-
essary criteria for determining "suitable age" only lends to the
weakness of the legislation.
Finally, Lizzie's Law fails to properly define the term "as-
sent."186 Assent 8 to a given event is commonly indicated
either expressly 18 or impliedly,'89 by written and/or verbal
means, yet Lizzie's Law fails to set forth a description for "as-
sent." As such, the law fails in its duty to apprise children,
along with their third party custodial representatives or guard-
ians, of exactly what type of assent will qualify as adequate to
continue and/or reinstate visitation following a parent's convic-
tion for domestic murder.
In addition to the above, further weakness may be found
in the fact that Lizzie's Law operates under a limited construc-
tion. Specifically, only those parents convicted of first degree
domestic murder will fall under its control. This Note suggests
that the conviction base of Lizzie's Law be expanded. While
murder in the first degree is commonly defined as a deliberate
attempt to cause the death of another person," second de-
gree murder should be recognized as well, as this degree of
murder also involves a recognized indifference to human life
which results in the death of an individual. 9' Moreover, of
equal destructive effect to the parent-child relationship are
those crimes committed by one parent against the other par-
ent, whether or not in direct view of the child, which are of a
forcible sexual nature (e.g., rape in the first degree).'92 Such
offense involves a forcible sexual act resulting in physical, emo-
tional and psychological scarring in addition to the risk of
188 See supra note 16.
, A declaration of willingness to do something in compliance with a request.
Assent implies a conscious approval of facts actually known, as distinguished from
mere neglect to ascertain facts. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (6th ed. 1990).
1' To declare something expressly means a statement which is openly declared.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (6th ed. 1990).
' Implied assent means that which is presumed by law and proved by the
conduct of the party. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 116 (6th ed. 1990).
,' Supra note 155 and accompanying text.
191 Supra note 157 and accompanying text.
*" See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 1998).
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death associated with spreading of the HIV virus, sexually
transmitted diseases and/or internal bleeding. It may be ar-
gued that sexual crimes do not permanently deprive a child
victim of one parent, as does physical death in the case of
domestic murder, and, as such, should not be addressed in this
legislation. However, the emotional and mental death which
commonly follows the occurrence of sexual crimes undoubtedly
acts to permanently cripple the parent-child relationship, re-
moving a parent indefinitely from his or her child's life, growth
and development. Lizzie's Law should be broadened and
strengthened to include not only first degree murder but sec-
ond degree murder and first degree rape as well, so as to ade-
quately protect all child victim's of domestic murder (whether
that murder be the physical, mental or emotional death) of the
child's other parent. By broadening Lizzie's Law to include
other violent criminal offenses, Lizzie's Law will avoid the dis-
turbing result which is currently possible whereby children of
parents convicted of first degree domestic murder are protected
from forced visitation but children of parents convicted of
equally violent crimes against the child's other parent remain
at the mercy of the court's discretion concerning forced
visitation.
Further, the possibility presently exists whereby a parent
may commit a crime recognized under Lizzie's Law outside the
State of Massachusetts and then subsequently return to his or
her Massachusetts residence believing he or she has avoided
the wrath of Lizzie's Law. In order to address such scenario,
Lizzie's Law should be amended to recognize that whether or
not the criminal act took place in the State of Massachusetts
or in another jurisdiction, the criminal parent will be held
accountable under Lizzie's Law if such act, had it been accom-
plished in the State of Massachusetts, would have constituted
an offense recognized under Lizzie's Law.
Finally, some confusion remains as to why the second
clause of Lizzie's Law prohibits, prior to issuance of a visita-
tion order, any person from visiting, with the child present, a
parent convicted of first degree domestic murder without the
consent of the child's custodian or legal guardian.'93 In this
secondary clause, the voice of the child victim has been quieted
193 See supra note 16.
1278 [Vol. 64: 4
HEALING THE SCARS OF DOMESTIC MURDER
and replaced with that of his or her custodian or legal guard-
ian. The altering of authority regarding visitation found within
this secondary clause may be attributed to the fact that in this
instance, the law may be referring to the visitation desire of an
adult figure outside the immediate family. As such, the child
victim may possess merely a secondary voice to his or her
custodian or guardian in such situations. This reasoning, how-
ever, would contradict the premise behind Lizzie's Law-that it
was enacted to give children a controlling voice when faced
with a forced visitation request. By providing that a person
may visit with an incarcerated parent, with the child present,
if the child's custodian or legal guardian consents, the courts
have presented themselves with a complex problem. For exam-
ple, if prior to the issuance of a visitation order, a child
victim's legal guardian (who happens to be both the child's
grandmother and the incarcerated parent's mother) consents to
allow the child's grandfather to visit the incarcerated parent
with the child victim present (even though the child victim
does not consent), Lizzie's Law has somehow failed to operate
properly.
194
By leaving the above-discussed terms and clauses open to
varying individual understandings, random judicial interpreta-
tion is, once again, invited to creep in. This will doubtlessly
continue the legacy of inconsistent case law which existed prior
to Lizzie's Law and which Lizzie's Law has attempted to eradi-
cate. Thus, unless the above ambiguities are recognized and
corrected in Lizzie's Law and similar newly drafted child pro-
tection acts, Lizzie's Law and its successors may inadvertently
hurt the child victims these acts have been designed to protect.
C. Proposal for Improvements to Lizzie's Law
Lizzie's Law would do well to emulate New York's Lee-
Anne Cruz Memorial Act and recognize custody along with
visitation. This Note, however, advocates three additional
"' See similar scenario in Guardianship of Norman et aL.. 670 N.E.2d 414
(Mass. 1996) (despite court visitation order mandating that children not see father
who was convicted of murdering children's mother, guardian paternal grandparents
allowed such visitation to take place. Probate and family court thereupon removed
guardianship role from paternal grandparents yet expanded their visitation priv-
ileges. Appeals Court subsequently vacated such visitation privileges).
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goals: the broadening of Lizzie's Law's conviction base from
first degree murder to include second degree murder and first
degree rape; clarification of the terms "parent," "suitable age,"
and "assent"; and qualification of the guardian's role in allow-
ing/disallowing visitation. Set forth below are specific sugges-
tions for improvement.
Lizzie's Law might be amended to read as follows:
No court shall make an order providing visitation rights to a par-
ent* who has been convicted of first degree murder, second de-
gree murder or first degree rape** of the other parent of the
child who is the subject of the order, unless such child is of suitable
age*** to signify his assent**** and assents to such order; provid-
ed, further, that until such order is issued, no person shall visit,
with the child present, a parent who has been convicted of murder
in the first degree, murder in the second degree or first de-
gree rape of the other parent of the child without the consent of
the child's custodian or legal guardian and despite custodial or
guardian consent, should the child object to being present at
such visitation episode with such third person, the child's
wish shall govern and no visitation by the child will oc-
cur.*****
Definitions
*"parent": The term parent includes not only natural birth parents
but also individuals acting as parents through legal adoption, long-
term (minimum of 2 years continuous) foster care, and individuals
lacking biological parental rights yet acting or having acted as a
parental figure to the child victim at issue (minimum of 2 years
continuous). The person occupying the parental role may be bonded
to the other parent through heterosexual marriage, same-sex mar-
riage, or common law marriage (heterosexual OR same-sex, if recog-
nized).
The above person may occupy the role of parent provided said
individual occupies a place in the child victim's life for a substantial
period of time and influence. In determining substantial period of
time and influence, the judicial figure presiding over the visitation
proceeding shall give equal weight and consideration to the follow-
ing, nonexclusive, factors:
1. Individual's monetary support of the child's health, welfare
and education.
2. Whether individual ever resided with child at one residence
and term of residency.
3. Status and nature of individual's relationship to child's other
parent and length of that relationship.
4. Child's recognition, or lack thereof, and child's classification
of individual's role in child's life (i.e., does child refer to convicted
parent as mother/father or some derivative thereof).
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*Conviction Base: This child protection act shall control whether
or not the criminal act at issue occurred within the State of Massa-
chusetts or in another jurisdiction so long as said act would consti-
tute murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree or rape
in the first degree under Massachusetts penal law and provided
parent committing said crime is a resident of the State of Massachu-
setts.
***"suitable age": Whether a child is of "suitable age" to signify his
or her assent remains at the discretion of the presiding judicial
figure following an evaluation of (1) the child's biological years; (2)
the child's academic progress (or lack thereof); and (3) a private
conference between the judiciary and both the child at issue, in one
instance, and his or her custodian or guardian, in a latter instance.
This conference shall be used to assess the mental and emotional
response of the child toward the convicted parent, the mental and
emotional response of child toward the guardian/custodian, and the
reasons for consenting to visitation at this juncture. Should these
considerations fail to adequately satisfy the court that the child is of
suitable emotional and mental maturity to signify assent, a court
appointed child psychiatric expert and/or custodial appointed child
psychiatric expert shall be allowed to direct an opinion to the judi-
cial figure as to the child's understanding of his or her assent as
well as the child victim's level of emotional and mental maturity.
****"assent": Express assent must be given to the presiding judicial
figure through verbal or written means. In the event the child lacks
capacity (e.g., due to handicap, extreme youth, or physical/mental
disability) to indicate express consent through written or verbal
means, implied assent may be determined at the discretion of the
presiding judicial figure through evaluation of the conduct of the
child at issue when placed in the presence of the convicted parent or
based upon testimony of the child victim's guardian/custodian.
*****Guardian/Custodial Right to Assent to Visitation: Prior to
a visitation order being issued, a person shall be allowed to visit,
with the child present, a convicted parent by acquiring consent of
the child's custodian or legal guardian unless the child objects to
being present at such visitation. In such instance, the visitor must
visit alone. At no time should the wishes of the guardian or custodi-
an override those of the child concerning the child's presence at any
visitation episodes and prior to issuance of a visitation order.
D. Expansion of Lizzie's Law: Addressing Concerns of Victims'
Rights and Battered Women's Groups
Upon expansion of Lizzie's Law to encompass parents
convicted of not only first degree murder but also second de-
gree murder and first degree rape, the risk emerges that
Lizzie's Law will harm parental victims of domestic violence
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who subsequently kill their abusers.'95 Addressing such con-
cerns, Massachusetts' Lizzie's Law was revised five times prior
to enactment so as to adequately represent the concerns of
advocates of battered women." The final version of Lizzie's
Law was specifically limited to first degree murder based upon
the belief that it would probably not apply in cases of a parent
who kills an abusive spouse as such murderers are not com-
monly convicted of first degree murder 9 but of a lesser de-
gree of murder due to the defense of "battered women's syn-
drome."'98 Therefore, should Lizzie's Law and similar child
protection acts be expanded to include more than first degree
murder, it is important to note that these laws act merely as
mechanisms giving child victims added legal protection."s
Lizzie's Law and its successors will not perpetually strip the
visitation rights of a convicted battered parent if the child at
issue assents to visitation. ° It is highly unlikely, even with
a broadening of the conviction base, that Lizzie's Law would
hurt the visitation rights of a formerly battered parent as a
child cohabitating with an abusive (now deceased) parent and
an abused (now incarcerated) parent would likely recognize the
innate incorrectness of any such abuse (unless, of course, the
abused was also an abuser). As such, the child would likely not
have any objections to visiting the formerly abused parent in
prison and would assent to visitation. Thus, while expansion of
Lizzie's Law to include offenses beyond first degree domestic
murder is feared by some and lauded by others in the victim's
rights arena, where the parent-child relationship between a
"
9
'See Oct. Interview with Caron, supra note 176.
196 Id.
' See Henriette Campagne, Visitation Bill Overwhelmingly Approved, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., July 21, 1997, at 5.
19 See Battered Women's Expert Testimony, Past and Present (PLI N.Y. Prac.
Skills Course Handbook Series No. F0-001V, 1998) (battered women act in ways
that are incomprehensible to the average person); see also Cahn, supra note 19, at
1097. Even when criminal court has dismissed evidence and testimony relating to
battered women's syndrome, such evidence remains relevant to custody proceedings
(and thus, likely visitation proceedings) in family court. See Cahn, supra note 19,
at 1097.
'" See Oct. Interview with Caron, supra note 176.
200 See supra note 16.
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child victim and formerly abused (presently convicted) parent
is sufficiently strong, any subsequent expansion in Lizzie's
Law will not act to break what cannot be broken.2"'
V. POLICY REASONS FOR ACKNOWLEDGING VOICE OF CHILD
VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC MURDER
Several valid policy reasons exist for developing and en-
forcing child protection acts similar to Lizzie's Law. First,
implementation of such acts will prevent the legal system,
which is often inadequately responsive to the needs of minors,
from further harming child victims of domestic murder (and
other similar criminal acts) through episodes of forced visita-
tion."2 While some may argue that harm continues to befall
a child victim through suspension of visitation privileges and
subsequent estrangement of the parent-child relationship, the
rights of the child to visit the convicted parent are not sus-
pended indefinitely. Should the child victim choose to visit
with the incarcerated parent when he or she is of age to prop-
erly assent, visitation would ensue.0 ' Moreover, any impair-
ment of the parent-child relationship through implementation
of Lizzie's Law runs secondary to the primary harm which
came into existence the moment the violent act of murder
occurred disrupting the child's life and leaving them sans one
parent.
Policy favoring Lizzie's Law also addresses the harm a
domestic murder brings to the surviving adult family members
of the crime victim. Specifically, Lizzie's Law, by mandating
suspension of visitation rights until the child assents to visita-
tion, alleviates third party custodial fear of a given judge's
discretion in a fragile visitation determination04 and guaran-
tees against the unpredictability of the judiciary. 5 Moreover,
by disallowing visitation rights (and continued court appear-
201 Subsequent concerns of victims' rights groups can be adequately addressed
by adopting the domestic violence exception clause such as that found within New
York's Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act. See supra note 149.
2 See Lizzie's Lasting Legacy, supra note 6.
203 See supra note 16; see also Cellucci Signs Bill to Protect Child Victims of
Domestic Murder, PATRIOT LEDGER, Aug. 16, 1997, at 26.
2"4 See Case, supra note 17.
206 See Aucoin, supra note 3.
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ances) until the child assents to visitation, Lizzie's Law pre-
vents the continual harassment of the crime victim's family..
by the convicted parent through his or her repeated petitions
for forced visitation. °7 These repeated petitions have an emo-
tional impact upon the child victim and invite the convicted
parent to exercise control over the crime victim's family, throw-
ing them, once again, into turmoil by forcing them to relive
their family member's murder.0 8 Lizzie's Law not only serves
the interests of the child and the crime victim's family but also
the interests of society by saving taxpayers' dollars. Prior to
Lizzie's Law, guardian's funds earmarked for the health, safe-
ty, and welfare needs of child victims were being utilized for
needless courtroom battles.0 9 This fact is made even more
unconscionable when one realizes that the convicted parent's
requests for forced visitation were supported by state funds
(i.e., taxpayers).
Finally, the ramifications of forcing a child to visit with a
parent whom the child associates with past episodes of domes-
tic violence are well documented. Specifically, children revisit-
ing violent environments suffer physical, psychological, behav-
ioral and developmental harm.210 Moreover, authorities have
agreed that witnessing domestic violence within a household
environment may create trauma, shock, fear and guilt closely
resembling post-traumatic stress disorder.1 As children's
values, attitudes and coping mechanisms suffer due to domes-
tic violence in the household, they are more likely to be violent
with their mates and tolerate more violence as adults.1 2
Thus, forcing a traumatized child to visit a parent convicted of
206 Id.
207 Id.
2" See Associated Press, Parental Rights of Killers at Issue, TELEGRAM & GA-
ZETTE, July 2, 1997, at 110. Moreover, repeated appeals brought by convicted and
incarcerated parents of denial of visitation rights may in certain instances block
adoption proceedings of the child's guardian. See Eagan, supra note 7.
20 In New York, for example, Larry Cruz may re-petition the court for visita-
tion every six months as prisoner's legal fees are footed by taxpayers.
2' See Youdelman, supra note 32, at 200.
211 See id. at 201.
212 See LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN 16-17 (1979).
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the murder of that child's other parent merely acts to
perpetuate the murderous event in the child's mind, and as
such, defies all logic.213
CONCLUSION
Massachusetts' Lizzie's Law is a relevant piece of family
law legislation which will likely bring extensive changes to the
world of children's rights.214 Lizzie's Law recognizes the larg-
er state duty to protect the voice of children today in order to
secure the voice of the nation in the future. In determining the
weight to be placed upon a child's wish relative to visitation,
Lizzie's Law has not overlooked the two foremost edicts of
family law legislation in the area of domestic violence, namely,
violence against a parent predates violence against a child215
and each generation learns to be violent by being a participant
in a violent family."6 Remaining ignorant in the present to
the voice of children will only leave us unsteady in the future,
and "that which is written is Doom. Unless the writing be
erased."217
Danice M. Kowalczyk
213 See Lizzie Deserves Better, supra note 11.
214 Lizzie's Law has been compared to Megan's Law (which requires that neigh-
bors be notified when a sex offender moves into their community) as a result of
its interest in the protection of children and the fast-moving pace by which it has
influenced copycat legislation throughout the individual states.
215 See Youdelman, supra note 32, at 189, 199.
216 See id. at 198.
217 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 98.
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